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1. Mergers and acquisitions: A closer look
Mergers and acquisitions (M&A) represent a popular strategy used by firms for many
years, but the success of this strategy has been limited. In fact, several reviews have shown that,
on average, firms create little or no value by making acquisitions (Hitt, Harrison, & Ireland, 2001).
While there has been a significant amount of research on mergers and acquisitions, there
appears to be little consensus as to the reasons for outcomes achieved from them (King, Dalton,
Daily, & Covin, 2004). Herein, we begin by reviewing some of the extant research on mergers
and acquisitions, identifying the key variables on which the studies have focused. Thereafter, we
summarize some of the major work on a primary reason for failure—paying too high a
premium—and discuss why executives often delay too long the divestiture of poorly performing
businesses that were acquired. Additionally, we examine research suggesting the importance of
an acquisition capability based on organizational learning from the acquisitions and
complementary science and technology for strategic renewal. Finally, we end with a discussion
of the research on cross-border mergers and acquisitions which have become prominent in
recent years.

2. Research on mergers and acquisitions
A representative review of the extant research on mergers and acquisitions over the last
25 years (89 articles) produced a list—available from the authors—of the most common
variables studied. The top three research variables include:
1. The extent to which the acquisition increased the diversification of the acquiring firm/the
relatedness of the acquiring firm (58% of the studies);
2. Firm size or the relative size of the acquired to the acquiring firm (52% of the studies);
and
3. The acquisition experience of the acquiring firm (28% of the studies).
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The method of payment for target firms appeared in 18% of the studies, with more emphasis in
research after 2004.
While there are logical arguments to suggest that target firms with greater relatedness to
an acquiring firm should produce higher performance, existing research provides mixed
evidence. The recent research by Palich, Cardinal, and Miller (2000) suggests a curvilinear
relationship between relatedness and performance. Mixed results from prior research can be
explained by the fact that few of the studies examined nonlinear relationships.
The impact of firm size on acquisition performance likely results from the effectiveness of
the integration process, with integration being more difficult for larger acquisitions. Yet, the
acquired firm must be large enough to have an impact on the acquiring firm’s performance (King,
Slotegraaf, & Kesner, 2008). While a complex relationship, research findings for firm size are
more consistent than for many of the other variables.
Acquisition experience has been the subject of study for a number of years because of its
assumed importance. Yet, the more critical issue is likely to be the amount learned from making
an acquisition. Obviously, a firm with some experience should be able to learn from additional
acquisitions, but having more experience does not ensure that greater learning occurs. Early
experiences can produce more learning than later experiences but without adequate absorptive
capacity, early lessons may be generalized to subsequent acquisitions to which they are not
applicable. Thus, the relationship between experience and learning is likely to be curvilinear but
also even more complex (Haleblian & Finkelstein, 1999). While prior research and its
conclusions are useful, increased utilization of a common set of variables in M&A research could
minimize model under-specification and facilitate achieving greater consensus on the drivers of
acquisition performance. This being the case, we still need to learn more about the requirements
for making successful acquisitions; toward that end, we examine next some factors that
contribute to acquisition failure and success.

3. Acquisition premiums
While the acquisition premium has been identified as a significant variable (Krishnan, Hitt,
& Park, 2007; Sirower, 1997), it has been examined in only a minority of M&A studies. An
acquisition premium is the price paid for a target firm that exceeds its pre-acquisition market
value. Over the past 20 years, the average premium paid has been 40%-50% (Laamanen, 2007).
The justification for a premium is the potential synergy that can be created in the merger of the
two firms. A premium is paid to entice the target firm shareholders to sell to the acquiring firm.
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However, the premium paid should not and cannot be greater than the potential synergy if the
acquisition is to produce positive returns. Of course, it is difficult to predict the value that can be
created by synergy, and it is often difficult to realize the potential synergy because of the
challenges of achieving integration (Sirower, 1997).
There are other reasons that acquiring firms pay large premiums. One such reason stems
from agency factors when top executives engage in opportunistic behavior that provides them
personal gains (Trautwein, 1990). Because acquisitions increase the size of a firm, they often
have a positive effect on a top executive’s compensation and enhance his/her power.
Furthermore, if the acquisition diversifies the firm, it may also reduce that top executive’s
employment risk. Because these are personal gains that rarely produce positive returns for the
acquiring firm, acquisitions made for these purposes are unlikely to be successful.
Another reason for high premiums is executive hubris (Roll, 1986). In this context, hubris
is executives’ overconfidence that they can achieve the synergy projected when the firm is
acquired and integrated. Yet, firms acquired where hubris is a major factor are unlikely to
achieve the needed synergy. As a result, firms may pay too high a premium and are unable to
earn adequate returns to compensate for the premium and also produce a positive return
(Hayward & Hambrick, 1997). When hubris is instrumental in the acquisition, it is not uncommon
for the CEO to do a less than adequate job of due diligence or to ignore negative information
provided by the due diligence process (Hitt et al., 2001).
However, Sirower (1997) downplays hubris as a primary factor in paying too high a
premium for a target. Rather, he suggests three alternative causes for overpayment: (1)
unfamiliarity with critical elements of the acquisition strategy, (2) lack of adequate knowledge of
the target, and (3) unexpected problems that occur in the integration process. Overpayment may
also result from decision biases; for example, Baker, Pan, and Wurgler (2009) found that the
majority of acquisition announcements use a target firm’s 52-week trading high to determine
acquisition premiums. Still, while an unsuccessful acquisition may be due to a lack of capabilities
or experience on the part of the executive, an assumption on the part of managers that they can
make a deal work (hubris) likely plays a role in premium overpayments.
Other factors can also influence premiums paid. For example, relationships between
individuals in the two firms may lead to higher premiums, especially if those relationships are
board interlocks (Haunschild, 1994). Of course, multiple bidders for a particular target also drive
up the premiums paid for an acquisition. These cases have been termed the winner’s curse,
whereby the acquirer with the winning bid often overestimates a target firm’s value (Coff, 2002).
3 Hitt, King, Krishnan, Makri, Schijven, Shimizu & Zhu

Most of the research suggests that paying high premiums is likely to result in negative
performance of the firm, due to an inability to earn adequate returns beyond the premiums paid
(Datta, Narayanan, & Pinches, 1992). A large premium places a major burden on managers of
the acquiring firm to recoup those costs and extract sufficient synergies from the merged firm.
Research suggests that about 70% of acquiring firms fail to deliver the necessary results to
recoup the premium payment (Sirower, 1997). Because managers in the acquiring firm face
tremendous pressure, they are likely to take additional actions in attempt to garner positive
returns. For example, they frequently engage in restructuring processes to consolidate assets
and sell off others that are considered redundant (Cascio, Young, & Morris, 1997). This
restructuring action basically results in operational synergy, but it is often inadequate to recoup
the high costs of the acquisition because of large premiums. Under such conditions, managers
then often engage in more risky actions designed to reduce costs and increase cash flows from
the acquisition. For example, a common action is large-scale workforce reductions (Krishnan et
al., 2007). Unfortunately, employee turnover erodes the human capital in firms, reduces the
performance of the acquiring firm (Cording, Christman, & King, 2008), and harms the long-term
value of the acquired firm’s assets.

4. Divestiture of acquired businesses
When acquisitions are unsuccessful, it may be wise to divest a business rather than
continue to suffer losses from that acquired business. For example, after several years of
experiencing losses, Daimler-Chrysler divested the Chrysler assets, even though it had to do so
at a significant loss from what it originally paid to acquire Chrysler. Some argue that
DaimlerChrysler should have sold Chrysler much sooner to avoid suffering those losses, as it
may have been able to obtain a higher price for the Chrysler assets. In fact, Time Warner also
suffered criticism for several years suggesting the need to divest AOL, even if it had to do so at a
loss. Recently, the company announced that the AOL assets would be spun off from the parent
firm.
While important, there has been a dearth of research on divestitures of acquired
businesses (Brauer, 2006). A decision to divest an acquired business is essentially reversing a
major strategic decision made earlier, often by the same executive. Therefore, the divestiture
decision is influenced by various psychological and organizational factors (Shimizu & Hitt, 2004).
Yet, because of the high rate of failure associated with acquisitions, eventual divestiture of
acquired businesses is not uncommon. For example, Kaplan and Weisbach (1992) found that 44%
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of the acquisitions they studied were eventually divested. Acquired firms are likely to be divested
when the acquired unit is performing poorly, but also when organizational inertia to maintain the
acquisition is low, when the business unit is smaller, and when the acquired firm is young and
small. Also, when parent firms have divestiture experience, they are more likely to divest
acquired businesses (Shimizu & Hitt, 2005).
Oftentimes, executives escalate their commitment to the prior decisions and try to avoid
divesting the business (Shimizu, 2007). However, when the acquiring firm’s overall performance
is strong and it has higher slack, executives are often more willing to divest poorly performing
acquired businesses (Hayward & Shimizu, 2006). Certainly, acquired businesses that are
performing poorly are more likely to be divested when there is a change in the CEO and when
more independent directors are added to the board. Thus, there are a number of non-business
factors that contribute to making decisions to divest businesses that have not produced the
synergy and positive returns predicted when they were acquired.

5. Acquisition capability development
There are at least two important types of learning in acquisitions. Drawing from success
or failure experiences, firms can learn to (1) select better future targets, and (2) improve their
integration processes for future acquisitions. We referred to this type of learning earlier. In this
section, we also examine learning from the target firm, especially after it is acquired.
While relatedness between the target and acquiring firms is important, research has
shown that synergy is created largely by complementary capabilities. Complementary
capabilities are different abilities which fit or work well together. Although the integration of
complementary capabilities is an important criterion for success in acquisitions, much of the
knowledge underlying these capabilities is tacit. Furthermore, the true value to an acquiring firm
can only be captured if the valuable capabilities in the acquired firm are fully integrated into and
absorbed by the acquiring firm. This requires that the acquiring firm learn the new and valuable
knowledge stocks held by the acquired firm. If the acquiring firm is able to learn and absorb the
knowledge, thereby integrating it with its own knowledge stocks, it can create new and possibly
even more valuable capabilities. Thus, the learning that occurs in the acquisition process and the
integration thereafter is crucial to its success (Hitt et al., 2001). In fact, some firms have had
significant success in making acquisitions, and this success can be at least partially attributed to
their ability to learn from the acquired firms and to absorb and integrate the new knowledge in
order to build new capabilities. Two examples of such companies are Cisco Systems and
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General Electric.
While at a coarse-grained level, a positive linear relationship has been argued to exist
between acquisition experience and performance (Barkema, Bell, & Pennings, 1996; Barkema &
Schijven, 2008a, 2008b). At the same time, others have noted that the relationship is likely
curvilinear (Haleblian & Finkelstein, 1999; Zollo & Reuer, in press). The differences in results of
studies examining the relationships suggest that other factors are likely involved. While
experience suggests learning, it is a coarse-grained proxy for it. And, there are many factors that
likely affect the firm’s ability to learn as it gains experience.
Organizational learning in acquisitions is highly complex. First, there is the opportunity to
transfer experience into situations where it does not apply. For example, transferring acquisition
routines from one industry to another may not be effective. Essentially, the firm must learn to
adapt the knowledge gained to the context in which it is applied (Finkelstein & Haleblian, 2002).
Certainly, when the organizations are too homogeneous, very little learning can occur. Thus,
heterogeneity or differences between the firms is necessary for firms to acquire new knowledge
(Hayward, 2002). Alternatively, the firm must have adequate absorptive capacity in order to learn
the knowledge, so there must be some homogeneous elements that allow it to learn and
integrate the new knowledge.
Firms can institute processes by which they deliberately learn. For example, Haleblian,
Kim, and Rajagopalan (2006) argue that learning can be enhanced through an active process of
evaluating performance feedback from recent acquisitions. Of course, managers must then
analyze the acquisitions to understand the factors leading to the performance, regardless of
whether it is positive or negative. If the performance is strong, the routines used seemingly work;
if the performance is poor, however, they must be reevaluated and perhaps changed.
A third mechanism for learning is that of observing, and learning from, others. This is
often referred to as vicarious learning (Miner & Haunschild, 1995). Such learning tends to be
more exploratory than the mere exploitation of their current knowledge stocks gained from prior
experience. It also often occurs through board interlocks and the acquisition experience of the
firms on which their board members serve (Haunschild & Beckman, 1998). The bottom line is
that firms can learn from acquisitions, and probably must do so in order to gain the greatest value
from them.

6. Technological learning in acquisitions
Innovation has become an increasingly important source of value creation in many
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industries. The importance of innovation has been heightened by rapid technological change and
growing knowledge intensity in industries. Because of these factors, innovation must come faster
and there is a higher need for novel solutions, especially in high-technology industries. Thus,
firms have turned to mergers and acquisitions as an alternative strategy for obtaining the
knowledge necessary to create innovations with the speed needed and the novelty necessary to
either maintain a competitive advantage or to build a new one (King et al., 2008; Makri, Hitt, &
Lane, in press; Uhlenbruck, Hitt, & Semadeni, 2006). While some research suggests that
acquisitions may produce a reduction in innovation output over time (Hitt, Hoskisson, Johnson, &
Moesel, 1996), if a target with complementary capabilities is selected, acquisitions have the
opportunity to develop novel knowledge and to enhance the innovative output of an acquiring
firm.
A key element in the positive effect of acquisitions on innovation is the knowledge
relatedness between the acquiring and acquired firms and, of course, the ability to integrate the
knowledge into the acquiring firm (Cloodt, Hagedoorn, & Van Kranenburg, 2006). Makri et al. (in
press) examined the knowledge relatedness between acquiring and acquired firms in
high-technology industries. Their study emphasizes the importance of knowledge
complementarities between targets and acquirers, and suggests that firms in high-technology
industries have a higher likelihood of achieving novel inventions if they can identify and acquire
businesses that have scientific and technological knowledge that is complementary to their own.
The study found that the effects of knowledge complementarities are strongest when both
science and technology complementarities are combined; the integration of the two enhances
innovation quality and novelty.
The synergistic relationship between science and technology is based partly on the role
of science knowledge in the innovation process. Science knowledge provides the base for the
technological knowledge which is normally more focused on providing solutions to problems
(application). Thus, science enables a better understanding of a problem at hand whereas
technology helps to resolve those problems. Oftentimes, combining science knowledge from two
firms can help to produce more novel innovations, while combining technological knowledge
often leads to more incremental innovations. However, the combination of scientific and
technological complementarities in acquisitions is quite complex and challenging. In general, if
the acquiring and acquired firms possess similar knowledge stocks, the resulting innovations are
likely to be incremental. Certainly, it is helpful to have some similar knowledge stocks in order for
the acquiring firm to absorb other complementary knowledge stocks. Thus, managers of firms
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must manage effectively the breadth and depth of their own scientific and technological
knowledge, but also find ways to incorporate new knowledge in order to survive over the long
term. There are biases toward incremental innovations, partly because they provide short-term
returns and are less risky (Hoskisson, Hitt, Johnson, & Grossman, 2002). Yet, firms must seek
the more novel and complementary knowledge stocks in order to create unique knowledge that
leads to novel products and services over time. Another possible form of complementarity is
combining different geographic operations (Kim & Finkelstein, 2009); as such, we discuss
cross-border M&A next.

7. Cross-border mergers and acquisitions
In waves of mergers and acquisitions during the late 1990s and early 2000s, the number
of cross-border acquisitions has increased greatly (Shimizu, Hitt, Vaidyanath, & Pisano, 2004).
These acquisitions are often made for similar reasons as domestic acquisitions, but they also
broaden the reach of firms and allow them to effectively enter and/or enrich their competitive
position within international markets (Brakman, Garita, Garretsen, & Marrewijk, 2008). Much of
the prior research has examined cross-border acquisitions as a means of entering foreign
markets, compared to using joint ventures or Greenfield ventures (Isobe, Makino, & Montgomery,
2000). Some have argued that cross-border acquisitions actually reduce the transaction costs
involved in entering new markets (Brouthers & Brouthers, 2000).
While cross-border acquisitions may reduce certain types of costs, they still must
overcome the costs associated with the liability of foreignness in the host country; this includes
knowledge about the different culture, area regulations, and the pervasive business norms of the
location. Acquisitions help to overcome this liability because the acquired firm should have the
local knowledge needed, assuming that the acquiring firm can capture this knowledge in making
the acquisition (Eden & Miller, 2004).
More recently, scholars have used institutional theory to help understand how country
institutions affect firms’ choice of market entry and the performance outcomes of different modes
of entry (Brouthers, 2002; Xu & Shenkar, 2002). Research by Zhu, Hitt, Eden, and Tihanyi (2009)
found that acquiring firms are likely to create more value when the firms acquired are based in
countries with lower risks. In particular, firms are better able to achieve synergy when the
institutions of the host country are more similar to the institutions in the acquiring firm’s home
country. Clearly, however, firms based in developed countries that acquire firms in emerging
market countries commonly transfer knowledge stocks to the firms in the host country. This is
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likely to benefit more the firm in the host country than the acquiring firm, unless the newly
acquired firm can be effectively integrated into the acquiring firm (Kostova & Zaheer, 1999). The
acquiring firm is more willing to transfer these knowledge stocks because they have acquired the
firm’s assets and thus control the use of this knowledge, whereas the firm is less likely to do so in
international joint ventures where they have lower control over how that knowledge is used and
where it is applied. Obviously, integration is a critical element and is more complex and
challenging when the institutions differ greatly between the home and host countries
(Chakrabarti, Jayaraman, & Mukherjee, 2009).

8. Conclusions
Mergers and acquisitions have long been a popular strategy, and are increasingly
common in many industries. This strategy has been employed by both large and small firms, and
by established and newer firms. While at one time M&A was largely a strategy used by U.S. and
Western European firms, it has become much more common in other regions of the world, and
especially in acquisitions that cross country borders. While popular with many executives, it is a
highly complex strategy and one that is fraught with risk. In fact, even though the strategy has
been employed for several years and studied by countless scholars, a large number of
acquisitions fail to produce the results promised.
Herein, we have explored some of the reasons why acquisitions fail and have suggested
ways for firms to increase the probability of acquisition success. Certainly, firms must make
careful selections of their acquisition targets and try not to pay too high a premium; if they select
the wrong firm or the premium paid is too large, the likelihood of failure is high. Yet, if firms
search for and identify targets that have complementary capabilities and put in place
mechanisms that enrich their learning from the acquired firm, they are more likely to build new
capabilities and enhance their own competitive position in the market. In sum, mergers and
acquisitions can sometimes be a highly effective and successful strategy, but this strategy must
be very carefully designed and implemented.
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